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PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
I. REQUIREMENTS TO INTERVENE OF RIGHT ESTABLISHED
In Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant'
the South Carolina Supreme Court addressed the requirements for in-
tervention as a matter of right under the South Carolina Rules of Civil
Procedure (SCRCP) adopted in 1985.2 The Berkeley Electric court es-
tablished a four-part test under Rule 24(a)(2) of SCRCP and reversed
the trial court's denial of a motion to intervene as a matter of right.
Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc. (Berkeley Electric) initiated an
action against the town of Mt. Pleasant and sought an order to pro-
hibit the town from interfering with Berkeley Electric's rights under a
contract between the two parties. Berkeley Electric also sought an or-
der permanently enforcing its rights as sole supplier of electrical ser-
vices to a newly annexed area of Mt. Pleasant.3
South Carolina Electric & Gas Company (SCE&G) also claimed
the right to service the newly annexed area based on a subsequent
franchise agreement it had executed with Mt. Pleasant. SCE&G moved
to intervene in Berkeley Electric's suit against Mt. Pleasant as a mat-
ter of right under Rule 24(a) of SCRCP or, alternatively, for permissive
intervention under Rule 24(b) of SCRCP.4 The trial judge denied
SCE&G's motion to intervene, and SCE&G appealed.
The South Carolina Supreme Court held that SCE&G was entitled
to intervene as a matter of right under Rule 24(a)(2) of SCRCP.5 The
court stated that the rules permit liberal intervention when it pro-
1. 394 S.E.2d 712 (S.C. 1990).
2. Rule 24(a) of SCRCP provides:
(a) Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to intervene in an ac-
tion: (1) when a statute confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2)
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of
the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect
that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by ex-
isting parties.
S.C. R. Civ. P. 24(a).
3. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 713.
4. S.C. R. Civ. P. 24(b).
5. Because the court found that SCE&G had a right to intervene under Rule
24(a)(2) of SCRCP, it did not address SCE&G's other exceptions. Berkeley Electric, 394
S.E.2d at 716.
1
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motes judicial economy.6 Because Rule 24(a)(2) of SCRCP is almost
identical to Rule 24(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,7 the
court looked primarily to federal cases in establishing its guidelines.8
In determining whether the trial judge abused his discretion in de-
nying SCE&G's motion to intervene, the court adopted a four-part test
used by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt.9 To satisfy this test the intervening
party must:
(1) establish timely application; (2) assert an interest relating to the
property or transaction which is the subject of the action; (3) demon-
strate that it is in a position such that without intervention, disposi-
tion of the action may impair or impede its ability to protect that
interest; and (4) demonstrate that its interest is inadequately repre-
sented by other parties.10
Addressing the first part of the test, the court noted that SCE&G
filed its motion to intervene shortly after Berkeley Electric filed its
complaint. Therefore, an issue of timeliness did not exist.1 '
Under the second part of the test, SCE&G asserted that it had a
financial interest in the dispute because it stood to lose both potential
income and any investments it had made based on the belief that it
owned the exclusive right to serve the property in question. The court
found SCE&G's interest sufficient to warrant intervention under Rule
24(a)(2) of SCRCP. The court stated that the interest "must be deter-
mined in relation to the overall subject matter of the action and not in
relation to the particular issue that is before the Court."'1 2 However,
the court did not specify the particular types of interests that would
satisfy the test. This ambiguity is not surprising in light of the federal
courts' traditional inability to precisely define the interest necessary to
support intervention as a matter of right.' 3
6. Id. at 714.
7. FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a)(2).
8. See South Carolina Tax Comm'n v. Union County Treasurer, 295 S.C. 257, 260,
368 S.E.2d 72, 74 (Ct. App. 1988) (discussing appropriateness of using federal law to
interpret Rule 24 of SCRCP).
9. 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983).
10. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 714 (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt,
713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983) (quoting Smith v. Pangilinan, 651 F.2d 1320, 1323-24 (9th
Cir. 1981))).
11. Id.
12. Id. (citing Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1983)). The
dissent argued that the subject of the action was the contract between Mt. Pleasant and
Berkeley Electric. Because SCE&G was not a party to the contract, the dissent con-
cluded that SCE&G had no interest in the subject of the action. Id. at 716 (McInnis, J.,
dissenting).
13. See 3B J. Moopx & J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 24.07[2] (2d ed.
[Vol. 43
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In explaining the third part of the test, the court stated, "[A]
party need not prove that it would be bound in a res judicata sense by
the judgment, only that it would have difficulty adequately protecting
its interests if not allowed to intervene."' 4 The court indicated that a
declaration in Berkeley Electric's favor in the suit between Berkeley
Electric and Mt. Pleasant would as a practical matter prevent SCE&G
from realizing the financial benefits of its agreement with Mt. Pleasant.
In addition, the court noted that it would be extremely difficult for
SCE&G to attack collaterally any ruling adverse to its rights under the
agreement.15
The final part of the test requires that the applicant demonstrate
that its asserted interest will not be adequately represented by the ex-
isting parties. Although the burden of showing inadequate representa-
tion is on the applicant,l" the South Carolina Supreme Court followed
a United States Supreme Court decision construing Rule 24(a)(2) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and declared that the burden is
minimal 7
To determine whether the existing representation was adequate,
the court relied on three factors used by the Ninth Circuit in Sage-
brush: "(1) whether the existing parties will undoubtedly make all of
the intervenor's arguments; (2) whether the existing parties are capable
and willing to make such arguments; and (3) whether the intervenor
offers different knowledge, experience, or perspective on the proceed-
ings that would otherwise be absent."' 8 Applying these factors the
court found that SCE&G (1) raised issues outside the existing plead-
ings, (2) could assert certain defenses unavailable to Mt. Pleasant, and
(3) could bring in its experience in territorial service questions that
1990); 7C C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1908
(2d ed. 1986); H. LIGHTSEY & J. FLANAGAN, SOUTH CAROLINA CIVIL PROCEDURE 219 (2d ed.
1985). The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has stated that "the 'interest'
test is primarily a practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many appar-
ently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and due process." Nuesse v.
Camp, 385 F.2d 694, 700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
14. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 715 (citing Spring Constr. Co. v. Harris, 614
F.2d 374 (4th Cir. 1980)).
15. Id.; cf. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) (hold-
ing that stare decisis may provide a practical disadvantage that warrants intervention as
a matter of right when the party that seeks to intervene claims an interest in the prop-
erty that is the subject of the main action).
16. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 715 (citing South Carolina Tax Comm'n v.
Union County Treasurer, 295 S.C. 257, 368 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1988)).
17. The court stated that "the applicant need only show that the representation of
his interests 'may be' inadequate." Id. (citing Trbovich v. United Mine Workers, 404
U.S. 528, 539 n.10 (1912)).
18. Id.; see Sagebrush Rebellion, Inc. v. Watt, 713 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1983).
3
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arise after annexation.'9
The court declined to adopt the per se rule that a governmental
entity's representation of a private party's interest does not constitute
adequate representation. 0 The court noted, however, that Mt. Pleas-
ant lacked a direct economic interest in the proceedings and therefore
was not an adequate representative of SCE&G's interests.2'
The court clearly stated that the pragmatic consequences of a de-
cision to permit or deny intervention must be examined in the context
of the unique facts and circumstances of each case.22 Furthermore, it
adopted a four-part test that provides guidance for determining when a
court should grant a party's motion to intervene as a matter of right.
Whenever a party can demonstrate timely application, an asserted in-
terest in the action, the possible impairment of the right to protect
that interest, and the possible inadequacy of representation of that in-
terest by existing parties, the trial court should follow the supreme
court's liberal interpretation of Rule 24(a)(2) of SCRCP and grant the
party's motion to intervene.
E. Scott Sanders
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION REQUIREMENTS ADDRESSED
In White v. Stephens23 the South Carolina Supreme Court held
that neither the mere receipt of a power of attorney in South Carolina
nor the making of an alleged oral trust that was not to be performed in
South Carolina is sufficient to permit a court to exercise personal juris-
diction over a nonresident defendant. 24 The court concluded that these
activities do not satisfy the South Carolina long-arm statute25 or due
process requirements.
The appellant, Corrine Stephens, was a Georgia resident and the
daughter of Mabel White by her first marriage. The respondents, the
children of Jesse A. White, Sr. by his first marriage (the White chil-
dren), were residents of North Carolina and South Carolina. After their
19. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 715-16.
20. Id. at 716.
21. Id.; cf. South Carolina Tax Conm'n v. Union County Treasurer, 295 S.C. 257,
368 S.E.2d 72 (Ct. App. 1988) (affirming a denial of the Tax Commission's motion to
intervene as a matter of right in a dispute between a private party and a county trea-
surer on the grounds that the treasurer adequately represented the interest of the Tax
Commission).
22. Berkeley Electric, 394 S.E.2d at 714.
23. 300 S.C. 241, 387 S.E.2d 260 (1990).
24. Id. at 246, 387 S.E.2d at 263.
25. S.C. CoD ANN. § 36-2-803 (Law. Co-op. 1976).
[Vol. 43
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spouses died, Jesse and Mabel married.
In February 1968 Jesse deeded to Mabel the title to his house in
Chester County, South Carolina. After Jesse's death Mabel sold the
property and purchased a house on Sunset Drive in Chester County. In
September 1977 Mabel executed a will in which she left the Sunset
Drive property to the White children. In June 1982 Mabel executed
and recorded a power-of-attorney in Chester County with her daughter
Stephens listed as attorney-in-fact. Stephens never exercised the
power-of-attorney in South Carolina.
In May 1983 Mabel moved to Georgia, and in October 1983 she
sold the Sunset Drive property. Although Stephens attended the clos-
ing and helped her mother sell the furniture from the house, she was
not involved with the transaction and did not sign any documents re-
lated to the sale of the property. Mabel deposited the proceeds from
the sale in a Georgia bank. In 1985 Mabel executed a new will in Geor-
gia in which she left her entire estate to Stephens. On August 13, 1987,
Mabel died. The White children did not contest the 1985 will.
28
On June 29, 1988, the White children filed suit against Stephens in
the Chester County Court of Common Pleas. They alleged breach of
contract and demanded an accounting of the proceeds from the sale of
the Sunset Drive property. The White children claimed that at the sale
of the property, Stephens entered into an oral agreement with them
whereby the proceeds from the sale would be held in trust, the interest
from the trust would be used to take care of Mabel during her lifetime,
and upon Mabel's death the principal and any accrued interest would
be distributed among the White children.
27
Stephens denied that she entered into an agreement with the
White children and filed a motion to dismiss the case for lack of per-
sonal jurisdiction. The trial court denied her motion, and Stephens ap-
pealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether the trial court could exer-
cise personal jurisdiction over Stephens. 8
The South Carolina Supreme Court began its analysis by describ-
ing the process by which a court determines if it may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident. "First, in order for a court to have stat-
utory authority to exercise jurisdiction, the nonresident's conduct must
meet the requirements of South Carolina's long-arm statute. Second,
the nonresident must have sufficient contacts with South Carolina so
that the constitutional standards of due process are not violated.
2 9
The court began with the statutory analysis. It cited subsection
26. White, 300 S.C. at 243-44, 387 S.E.2d at 261.
27. Id. at 244, 387 S.E.2d at 261.
28. Id. at 243-44, 387 S.E.2d at 261.
29. Id. at 245, 387 S.E.2d at 262.
5
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36-2-803(1)(a) and subsection 36-2-803(1)(g) of the South Carolina
long-arm statute, which provide:
(1) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person who acts
directly or by an agent as to a cause of action arising from the per-
son's (a) transacting any business in this State; ... or (g) entry into a
contract to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this
State .... 110
The court then considered whether Stephens's activities satisfied
either of these subsections. Addressing subsection 36-2-803(1)(a), the
court stated, "The only actions that could possibly constitute the
'transaction of business' in South Carolina for the purposes of the long-
arm statute would be the receipt of the Power of Attorney and the
making of the alleged oral trust agreement."31 The court immediately
rejected the possibility that the long-arm statute covered those actions.
The court held that because Stephens never exercised the power of at-
torney in South Carolina and because the White children did not allege
that Stephens made the oral agreement as Mabel's attorney-in-fact,
"the mere receipt of a Power of Attorney does not constitute the trans-
action of business for jurisdictional purposes. '3 2 The court further held
that "the making of the oral trust agreement could not constitute the
transaction of business in South Carolina since it was not alleged that
the contract was entered into or that it was to be performed in this
state."33
Addressing subsection 36-2-803(1)(g), the court considered
whether Stephens's making of the alleged oral trust agreement with
the White children constituted the "entry into a contract to be per-
formed in whole or in part by either party in this State.'1 3 " The court
concluded "that a prima facie showing of a contract to be performed in
the state was not made."
'3
0
The court next considered whether Stephens had "purposefully es-
tablished 'minimum contacts' with this State such that the mainte-
nance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.' "31 The court stated the four factors used by South
Carolina courts to determine whether the requirements of due process
had been satisfied: "(1) the duration of the activity of the nonresident
in this state; (2) the character and circumstances of the commission of
30. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(a), (g) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
31. White, 300 S.C. at 246, 387 S.E.2d at 262.
32. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 263.
33. Id.
34. S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-2-803(1)(g) (Law. Co-op. 1976).
35. White, 300 S.C. at 247, 387 S.E.2d at 263.
36. Id. (quoting International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)).
[Vol. 43
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the nonresident's acts; (3) the inconvenience resulting to the parties by
conferring or refusing to confer jurisdiction over the nonresident; and
(4) the State's interest in exercising jurisdiction."
37
In applying these factors, the court first noted that "the duration
of Stephens's activities in this state was minimal."38 Second, the court
noted that the White children had not established that the alleged oral
trust agreement was entered into or to be carried out in this state.
Third, the court noted that extreme inconvenience would not result if
it declined jurisdiction because the defendant resided in Georgia and
the funds in dispute were located in Georgia.39 Finally, the court noted
that South Carolina's "interest in providing redress for its citizens...
diminished when no business was transacted in this state and any con-
tract formed was not to be performed in this State."
40
Stephens's contacts with South Carolina were limited to occasional
visits with her mother. These contacts "[did] not indicate that she pur-
posefully availed herself of jurisdiction nor [did] they create a substan-
tial connection with South Carolina."'41 Under the particular facts of
this case, the court's refusal to exercise personal jurisdiction over Ste-
phens was appropriate.
Dunn D. Hollingsworth
III. COURT INVALIDATES SERVICE OF PROCESS ON A NONRESIDENT WHO
WAS FRAUDULENTLY INDUCED TO ENTER THE FORUM STATE
In Shaw v. Hughes42 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that service of process upon a nonresident is invalid when the nonresi-
dent was fraudulently induced to enter the forum state under the pre-
text of settling a dispute.4 3 The court also found that an invalid service
of process is an insufficient basis for a court to acquire personal juris-
diction over a nonresident."
In 1985 Pennie Shaw and Joseph Hughes obtained a Florida di-
vorce decree. The decree awarded Hughes a gun collection that Hughes
had stored at the home of Shaw's father in Edgefield, South Carolina.
37. Id. (citing Colite Indus. v. G.W. Murphy Constr. Co., 297 S.C. 426, 377 S.E.2d
321 (1989); Atlantic Soft Drink Co. v. South Carolina Nat'l Bank, 287 S.C. 228, 336
S.E.2d 876 (1985)).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 248, 387 S.E.2d at 263.
40. Id., 387 S.E.2d at 264.
41. Id. at 247-48, 387 S.E.2d at 263.
42. 400 S.E.2d 501 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
43. Id. at 502.
44. Id.
7
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Shaw's failure to return the collection prompted Hughes to file two
motions for contempt in a Florida court. Both proceedings resulted in
orders requiring Shaw either to deliver the collection to Hughes or to
assist Hughes in obtaining the guns. Hughes still did not receive the
guns. When Shaw filed a partition action against Hughes in Georgia,
the state in which Hughes then resided, Hughes made a third attempt
to obtain the guns by filing a counterclaim.45
During the pendency of the Georgia partition action, Shaw filed
another action in South Carolina for malicious prosecution and for the
enforcement of a restraining order issued by a Florida family court.
Shaw contacted Hughes's attorney and stated that she would make the
guns available to Hughes if he would come to her home in Greenville,
South Carolina to pick them up. When Hughes arrived at Shaw's
home, he was served with a summons and a complaint for Shaw's
South Carolina suit. Shaw had never indicated that she intended to
serve Hughes. The trial court quashed the service of process on Hughes
and dismissed the action for lack of personal jurisdiction over
Hughes.4"
The court of appeals addressed two issues. The court first consid-
ered whether service of process is effective when the party to be served
is fraudulently induced to enter the state at the invitation of the resi-
dent party for the sole purpose of settling a dispute. The court also
considered whether a court has personal jurisdiction over a nonresident
based upon an invalid service of process.
In affirming the trial court's decision to quash the service of pro-
cess, the court adopted the majority rule that service of process upon a
nonresident should be set aside when fraudulently obtained.4 7 The
45. Id. at 501.
46. Id. at 501-02.
47. Id. at 502. The general rule has been stated as follows:
A person induced by artifice or fraud to enter a jurisdiction for the pur-
pose of serving process on him is a victim of abuse of process, and may apply
to have the summons set aside. Stated in greater detail, the rule provides that
if a person resident outside the jurisdiction of the court and the reach of its
process is inveigled, enticed, or induced, by any false representation, deceitful
contrivance, or wrongful device for which the plaintiff is responsible, to come
within the jurisdiction of the court for the purpose of obtaining service of pro-
cess on him in an action brought against him in such court, process served
upon him through such improper means is invalid, and upon proof of such fact
the court will, on motion, set it aside.
... Where a plaintiff or someone acting in his behalf induces a defendant
to enter the jurisdiction for the purpose of effecting the settlement of a contro-
versy and the defendant is then served with process while in the jurisdiction,
the service will be set aside as having been fraudulently obtained.
62B At Jun. 2D Process § 52 (1990) (footnotes omitted); see generally Annotation, At-
tack on Personal Service as Having Been Obtained by Fraud or Trickery, 98 A.LR2D
[Vol. 43
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court noted, however, that if the serving party "clearly indicated" to
the nonresident that it intends to serve the nonresident if the nonresi-
dent enters the forum state, then the service of process would be
valid.
48
One of the cases cited by the Shaw court in its analysis is Ci-
trexsa, S.A. v. Landsman.4s In Citrexsa nonresident Mexicans con-
tacted the plaintiffs to conduct settlement negotiations concerning a
commercial dispute. The parties agreed to meet in Florida. When the
nonresidents arrived at the conference, they were served with a sum-
mons and a complaint. The plaintiffs claimed that the trial court prop-
erly denied the nonresidents' motion to quash service because the non-
residents initiated the settlement meeting in Florida. The Citrexsa
court rejected this argument" and reversed the trial court's ruling.51
The court noted that the plaintiffs' "agreement to participate in the
settlement conference was merely an artifice to serve [the nonresi-
dents].15 2 The court established that "'service is void if obtained by
securing defendant's presence within the jurisdiction by . . . pretense
of settlement, whether the matter of settlement was first broached by
plaintiff or defendant.' ,,53
The Shaw court next considered the effect of the tainted service
on the trial court's jurisdiction. The court concluded that "[b]ecause
the service of process on Mr. Hughes proved invalid. . . the court did
not acquire jurisdiction over Mr. Hughes."'" As a general rule, "if per-
551, 576-80 (1964) (discussing cases in which courts quashed the service of process when
a defendant was served after being enticed into the forum state under the pretext of
settling a dispute).
48. Shaw, 400 S.E.2d at 502.
49. 528 So. 2d 517 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
50. Id. at 518.
51. Id. at 519.
52. Id. at 518.
53. Id. (quoting 72 C.J.S Process § 47 (1987)). Perhaps the Montana Supreme Court
best summarized the policy underlying the general rule that service is invalid when a
potential defendant is fraudulently enticed to enter a state: "The law favors the compro-
mise and settlement of disputed claims and should protect a nonresident who comes into
this state at the solicitation of his adversary for the purpose of attempting such a dispo-
sition of a controversy.. . ." State ex rel. Ellan v. District Court, 97 Mont. 160, 170, 33
P.2d 526, 530 (1934) (citation omitted). The Montana Supreme Court concluded with
this passage:
[A] party to a controversy has been induced for this purpose to come within
rifle range, as it were, under a flag of truce; if the purpose of the parley is not
accomplished, honor and fair dealing should dictate that such person be per-
mitted a reasonable time within which to return to the safety of the position
from which he was induced to withdraw, before his adversary goes into action.
Id. at 172, 33 P.2d at 531.
54. Shaw v. Hughes, 400 S.E.2d 501, 502 (S.C. Ct. App. 1991).
1991]
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sonal service of process is procured by fraud or trickery, it is insuffi-
cient to give a court jurisdiction over the person served." 55 There are
two bases of support for this rule. Some courts refuse to exercise juris-
diction over a nonresident when the serving party obtained service of
process by unlawful means."0 Other courts hold that service of process
acquired by fraud or trickery prevents the court from acquiring per-
sonal jurisdiction over the defendant. 57 The Shaw court adopted the
second approach.5 8
The Shaw court joined the majority of jurisdictions by holding
that service of process is invalid when the plaintiff fraudulently in-
duces the party served to enter the state for the sole purpose of the
settlement of a dispute. The court also decided that a fraudulently ob-
tained service of process is insufficient to give the court personal juris-
diction over the nonresident party.
Rebecca Dorman Groth
IV. AMENDMENT OF REMOVAL NOTICE AFTER EXPIRATION OF THE
REMOVAL PERIOD NOT ALLOWED
In Barnhill v. Insurance Co. of North America5" the United States
District Court for the District of South Carolina refused to allow a cor-
porate defendant to amend a notice of removal ° after the thirty-day
period for removal 1 had expired. The court remanded the case to state
court.
The district court determined that it did not have subject matter
jurisdiction and could not allow amendment of the removal notice for
three primary reasons. First, the court determined that other federal
courts that have construed section 1653,2 which allows defective alle-
55. 62B A. JuR. 2D Process § 52 (1990).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Shaw, 400 S.E.2d at 502 (citing Yarbrough v. Collins, 290 S.C. 76, 81, 348 S.E.2d
194, 198 (Ct. App. 1986) ("A defect in service of process of publication is jurisdictional
rendering any judgment or order obtained thereby void."), rev'd per curiam on other
grounds, 293 S.C. 290, 360 S.E.2d 300 (1987)).
59. 130 F.R.D. 46 (D.S.C. 1990).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) (1988).
61. See id. § 1446(b). Section 1446(b) requires a defendant to petition for removal
within 30 days after receiving the initial pleading or, if the initial pleading has been filed
in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, within 30 days after receiving
service of the summons, whichever period is shorter. Id.
62. Id. § 1653. This section applies to actions removed from state courts to federal
district courts as well as to actions initiated in federal districts courts. Barrow Dev. Co.
v. Fulton Ins. Co., 418 F.2d 316, 317 (9th Cir. 1969) (citing Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Robbins
[Vol. 43
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gations of jurisdiction to be amended in the trial or appellate courts,
generally have allowed amendments after the end of the removal pe-
riod only if the federal court already has entered judgment.6 3 Second,
the court determined that because Congress intended to restrict re-
moval, the court should resolve all doubts about the propriety of re-
moval in favor of retained state court jurisdiction.6 ' Third, the court
determined that after the thirty-day period for removal expires, defec-
tive allegations could be cured, but missing allegations could not be
supplied.
6 5
The plaintiff, Joe A. Barnhill, filed a declaratory judgment action
in state court to determine whether uninsured motorist coverage was
available from the defendant, Insurance Company of North America
(INA). INA removed the action to federal district court. The plaintiff
filed a timely motion to remand 6 and claimed that the notice of re-
moval failed to allege the state in which INA had its principal place of
business or place of incorporation. The notice of removal alleged that
the plaintiff and defendant were citizens of different states and that
INA was a corporation organized and existing under the laws of some
state other than South Carolina. The notice did not name the state of
incorporation, nor did it name INA's principal place of business or al-
lege that the principal place of business was diverse to the plaintiff.67
Section 1653 provides, "Defective allegations of jurisdiction may
be amended, upon terms, in the trial or appellate courts." '68 The court
noted that there is a "critical distinction between evaluating the pro-
priety of removal jurisdiction after judgment has been entered in a
federal proceeding rather than immediately after removal to federal
court."6 9 The court cited Able v. Upjohn Co. 7 0 as illustrative of the
different approaches federal courts apply depending on the posture of
the case. The court noted three factors that allowed the Able court to
affirm a lower federal court judgment, even though the appellate court
Coal Co., 288 F.2d 349 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 875 (1961); Royal Crest Dev.
Corp. v. Republic Ins. Co., 225 F. Supp. 76 (E.D.N.Y. 1963); Hernandez v. Watson Bros.
Transp. Co., 165 F. Supp. 720 (D. Colo. 1958)).
63. Barnhill, 130 F.R.D. at 49-50.
64. Id. at 50 (citing Able v. Upjohn Co., 829 F.2d 1330, 1332 (4th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 963 (1988); Toyota of Florence, Inc. v. Lynch, 713 F. Supp. 898, 900
(D.S.C. 1989)).
65. Id. at 51-52.
66. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1447(c) (West Supp. 1991). This section provides that a mo-
tion to remand a case based on any defect in the removal procedure must be made
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal. Id.
67. Barnhill, 130 F.R.D. at 49.
68. 28 U.S.C. § 1653 (1988).
69. Barnhill, 130 F.R.D. at 49-50.
70. 829 F.2d 1330 (4th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 963 (1988).
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had doubts about the initial propriety of removal jurisdiction. The fac-
tors are: "(1) affirmance did not serve to judicially expand the scope of
federal jurisdiction; (2) failure of the nonremoving party to object to
removal earlier; and (3) encourage judicial economy and finality and
avoid wasting judicial resources.'7 Because the plaintiff made a timely
motion to remand, no significant pretrial preparation had occurred,
and thus, none of the Able considerations were present in Barnhill.
7 2
The court relied on language from the legislative history of the
Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act"8 to explain its re-
strictive view of removal.74 The court listed five policy considerations
supporting its interpretation:
(1) preventing federal court infringement upon the rightful inde-
pendence and sovereignty of state courts;
(2) ensuring that judgments obtained in a federal forum are not
vacated on appeal due to improvident removal;
(3) reducing uncertainty as to the court's jurisdiction in the mar-
ginal cases... ;
(4) allowing amendment of the notice of removal under § 1653
after the thirty day time limit for removal specified in § 1446(b)
would "substantially eviscerate" the specific time provision enacted
by Congress; and
(5) conceding that the traditional justification for diversity juris-
diction-state court hostility toward nonresident defendants-has
been significantly reduced since the time diversity jurisdiction was
created.
7 5
The final principle the court enunciated in support of its holding
was that the majority of courts allow amendment after the thirty-day
removal period to permit the removing party to set forth more specifi-
cally each ground for removal,17 but disallow amendments to supply
missing or new allegations.77 The court compared its case to Van Horn
v. Western Electric. Co., 7 8 in which the corporate defendant failed to
71. Barnhill, 130 F.R.D. at 50 (citing Able, 829 F.2d at 1332-34).
72. Id.
73. Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 (1988) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 5, 9, 16, 17, 18, 28, 42 U.S.C.).
74. Barnhill, 130 F.R.D. at 48. Specifically, the court referred to the provision in the
Act that amended section 1446(a)'s removal procedure. The legislative history of the Act
indicates a congressional intent "'to reduce the basis for Federal court jurisdiction based
solely on diversity of citizenship.' "Id. (quoting HR. REP. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess.
44, reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ammn. NEws 5982, 6005).
75. Id. at 50-51 (citations omitted).
76. Id. at 51 (citing Thompson v. Gillen, 491 F. Supp. 24, 27 (E.D. Va. 1980)).
77. Id. (citing Richmond, F. & P.R.R. v. Intermodal Servs., Inc., 508 F. Supp. 804,
805 (E.D. Va. 1981) (mem.); Thompson, 491 F. Supp. at 27).
78. 424 F. Supp. 920 (E.D. Mich. 1977).
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allege its principal place of business in the removal notice.7 The Van
Horn court refused to allow the defendant to amend the notice to sup-
ply this allegation after the thirty-day period for removal had ex-
pired.8 0 The court also relied on Richmond, Fredericksburg, & Poto-
mac Railroad v. Intermodal Services, Inc.,81 which held that section
1653 does not permit amendment of the removal notice to correct an
omission of an allegation that concerns the corporate defendant's prin-
cipal place of business after the thirty-day period for removal expires.
82
Corporate defendants that seek removal of a case to the federal
district court in South Carolina must be sure to allege diversity of citi-
zenship from the plaintiff both as to state of incorporation and as to
principal place of business. The defendant should allege diversity in a
nonconclusory manner that specifically sets forth the plaintiff's state of
citizenship as well as the state of incorporation and principal place of
business of the corporate defendant.
Susan E. Rowell
79. Id. at 923.
80. Id. at 925.
81. 508 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Va. 1981) (mem.).
82. Id. at 807.
1991]
13
et al.: Practice and Procedure
Published by Scholar Commons, 1991
